Book offers important insights into complexities of international relations
“Containing History: How Cold War History Explains US-Russia Relations” by Stephen P Friot (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 418 pages, in stores)
I was born in 1942. FDR died on my third birthday. I was 5 when the United States dropped atomic bombs onto the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Geography and civics courses in my parochial grade school taught me that all Russians were Godless Communists. In high school and college, the courses I took in American and world history never had sufficient time in the semester or academic year to study events up to the “present day.” Honestly, history was never a favored subject until I discovered that geopolitical history needs to be supported by social history, personal history — the stories about everyday people who make the events happen. I have learned more about history and “herstory” in succeeding years simply out of interest in knowing and have also realized how much more there is to learn.
Stephen P. Friot is five years younger than I but he is much more knowledgeable about the history of international relations between the United States and its allies, as well as those relations with nations which, from a political perspective, I would consider our country’s foes. Reading “Containing History: How Cold War History Explains US-Russia Relations” has enabled me to put ideas and events into a perspective that approach a balanced view.
The author’s experiences through travel and study in Russia, as well as his thorough research into the complexities initiated by the Allies during the climax and denouement of World War II, yield a storehouse of information most readers will find enlightening. Judge Friot supports every statement, every revelation with scholarly documentation. Many of his sources are public servants and diplomats who worked behind the scenes to effect results that staved off military conflicts. Of course, that was not always effective: Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Hungary, Czechoslovakia are noteworthy examples.
Of specific significance is a reinforcement of the notion that actions by political leaders do not necessarily serve what the nation’s people believe. At some point, growing up with the stereotypical view that every Russian citizen was a carbon copy of Joseph Stalin or Nikita Khruschev had to be reversed. Like Friot, my experiences with immigrants from Russia and Kazakhstan were valuable lessons.
A particular emphasis on the word “contain” and its multiple forms is an important part of Friot’s message. The reader will explore, for example, how Truman and Churchill managed to contain Stalin’s incursions and his settling for satellites in Eastern Europe, including the Russian zone of surrendered Germany. With the large number of ground troops, he advanced toward the end of the war, he could have easily pushed the Soviet Union boundaries to the border between Germany and France or even to the North Sea and English Channel. The fact that the United States had a super weapon that no one else had was a key to containment. One also learns how NATO, despite its vague Article 5, managed to contain the growth of the Soviet Union and how it continues to limit Putin’s efforts to restore a semblance of the Soviet Union.
Although not everyone will enjoy Friot’s book, I suggest that many readers like me will explore the details and develop insights into the complexities of international relations we would not have gotten from the daily newspapers or the radio and later television newscasts. It is a book I read slowly. I gained perceptions into times gone by, times I have lived through mostly unaware of international situations that affected my life.