Invasions, and aftermath, then and now

On the eve of the invasion, there were 18,000 tanks and 100,000 troops massed along the border. Within 2 days, the invaders had penetrated

80 miles in-country, surrounded the capital, and back home, an isolated dictator basked in the glow of looming victory.

The President of the United States declaimed, “There’s no place in today’s world for this sort of naked aggression,” and the British Prime Minister added, “If we let this succeed, no small country can ever feel safe again.”

That President was George H. W. Bush, and the Prime Minister was Margaret Thatcher.

Within hours of the invasion, the Kuwaiti Ambassador to the UN requested the US’s assistance. Days later, seeing Iraqi forces on his border, the King of Saudi Arabia allowed international forces to enter his Kingdom.

It only took six days for the first international coalition forces to arrive, and in five months over half a million coalition troops had been deployed to the region. When Saddam Hussein refused to cede the territory he wrongfully occupied, the US-led coalition advanced.

In six short weeks, Operation Desert Storm was over. It was one of the most lopsided affairs in military history.

Doubtless, Vladimir Putin suffered from dual delusions: First, that his forces would sweep in with the ease that Hussein’s did; second, that the world would not come to Ukraine’s aid.

He certainly had reason to believe the latter. Our collective shrug over the annexation of Crimea, the relaxed operational stance of NATO nations (and our most recent ex-president’s palpable hostility towards the organization), and Brexit as a demonstration that the age of European unity may be waning.

All of these things probably made Putin feel like he could play Hussein without fear of facing a Stormin’ Norman, and Russia’s supposed numerical, doctrinal, and technological advantages probably misled Putin into thinking he could wrap the war up so quickly that it would exclude any response the West could mount.

Thanks to Ukraine’s incredible resolve, things did not go that way, but neither have they gone as they should. The invasion of Kuwait was sufficient reason for Desert Storm. NATO bombed Serbia into submission during the Kosovo War, even though the conflict did not involve NATO members. Syria. Afghanistan. Iraq (the sequel). Vietnam. Korea. There are plenty of examples of times the US became directly involved, even in proxy wars against the Soviets.

So I have a lot of trouble understanding the arguments for a limited involvement in Ukraine. Either we believe in sovereignty and believe that nations whose sovereignty is taken away by naked aggression deserve our defense or we no longer think things like that matter.

My largest concern since the beginning of the Russian invasion has been that at some later time we will realize that we need to be heavily involved, and by then it will be impossible to undo the damage that was done while we were hesitating.

The hundreds of billions of dollars of physical damage already done to Ukraine will not be wiped away, it will take decades to rebuild. Whole towns are gone. Without any place to go home to, only a small number of the 8 million Ukrainians now living abroad will ever likely return. And nothing will bring the thousands upon thousands of dead back to life.

President Zelenskyy has continuously asked for tanks, F-16s, and long-range missiles.

We have promised the tanks — although just 31 of them — but we are not hustling them into Ukrainian hands. The F-16 is an old Air Force jet used by several NATO nations. They are not a special super-weapon. We have sold them to dozens of countries (including Iraq!). The Ukrainians need F-16s to create air superiority in their own airspace. (And speaking as a Navy guy: trust me, the Air Force can spare a few.)

While attacks on Russian soil can be justified the same way bombing Baghdad and Belgrade were, I can understand not wanting US-made missiles to be the weapon for that mission. But there should be no limit to the amount or type of defensive weapons we provide.

Initially, the cautious approach was defensible. But the more we slow-roll our aid, the more time Putin has to grind buildings and people into dust. Eventually, when there is nothing left but dust, Putin will have won.