The Sentinel-Record

Colombia’s murders at all-time low, but activists still dying

- The Conversati­on is an independen­t and nonprofit source of news, analysis and commentary from academic experts. Fabio Andres Diaz is a researcher on Conflict, Peace and Developmen­t at the Internatio­nal Institute of Social Studies. Magda Jiménez is an asso

A 2016 peace agreement between the Colombian government and the guerrilla Revolution­ary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC, was supposed to bring peace to this South American country after a 52-year civil war that killed 220,000 people.

Instead, nearly 300 community organizers and activists have been murdered since the accords were signed in November 2016. Hundreds more have received death threats. Eight activists were killed in March alone.

During the same period, the overall homicide rate in Colombia has dropped to an all-time low.

As violence researcher­s who focus on conflict and inequality, we wanted to explore the data on the recent spate of targeted assassinat­ions. Why are so many Colombian activists dying?

Indigenous leaders under fire

Most of the community organizers assassinat­ed in Colombia over the past 16 months were political activists from three largely rural communitie­s: the small-scale farmers generally called “peasants” here, indigenous people and Afro-Colombians. These population­s face persistent social and economic discrimina­tion in Colombia.

Indigenous organizers have been particular targets of the violence. Just 3 percent of Colombia’s population identifies as indigenous, but 12 percent of the civil society leaders slain in 2017 were indigenous.

The crimes do not seem to be racially motivated. Rather, they appear to be political crimes, a retaliatio­n against the country’s 2016 peace process.

Murders have generally declined since the accords, dropping from 12,252 in 2016 to 11,781 in 2017. Colombia’s homicide rate is still worse than almost every other country in the world. But it’s a third of what it was two decades ago, at the peak of the country’s civil war.

Certain areas, however, have seen in marked uptick in political violence. The majority of the slain activists live in remote rural areas of Colombia, in provinces like Cauca, Antioquia, Putumayo and Nariño.

Historical­ly, the government has been either absent or very weak in these places. That allowed guerrilla groups and drug cartels to emerge in these areas in the late 20th century. These areas were home to some of the most brutal violence of Colombia’s civil conflict.

Now, these targeted assassinat­ions have local communitie­s again living in fear. Evidence from both Colombian and internatio­nal researcher­s suggests that the killings are a response to the Colombian government’s attempt to assert control over areas once overrun by organized crime.

The 2016 peace accord includes economic developmen­t provisions formalizin­g the land ownership for peasants and helping coca-leaf growers plant legal crops like cacao and coffee. Coca leaf, a mild stimulant traditiona­lly consumed as a tea or chew in the Andes region, is also the main ingredient in cocaine. In Colombia, as in Bolivia — where coca cultivatio­n is legal — it is largely grown as a subsistenc­e crop by peasant farmers.

These rural economic developmen­t initiative­s are supposed to bring Colombia’s most marginaliz­ed citizens into the fold. In doing so, they threaten the various drug cartels and paramilita­ry groups that have become rich processing and traffickin­g illicit Colombian coca. These groups are now fighting back, targeting local organizers who support the government’s plan.

Research from the Colombian investigat­ive news outlet Datasketch finds that almost three-quarters of activists killed in since November 2016 months reside in Colombia’s coca-growing countrysid­e.

The crop substituti­on strategy is a bigger problem for criminal organizati­ons in Colombia than the government’s prior strategy of forced coca eradicatio­n. That merely reduced supply, often leading coca prices to rise, which actually benefited trafficker­s.

It’s unlikely that crop substituti­on could ever completely eliminate coca production in Colombia. But the government investment, monitoring and interventi­on that comes with the process will greatly hurt business.

Cartels aren’t the only criminal groups threatened by Colombia’s new rural developmen­t initiative­s. Datasketch also finds that two-thirds of the 282 assassinat­ion victims lived near illegal gold mines, which the government also plans to replace with legal operations.

Fabio Andres Diaz and Magda Jimenez AP’s The Conversati­on

Who’s killing Colombia’s activists

The government’s response to this wave of targeted violence has been feeble, even contradict­ory.

Colombia has a general election this year, but only one presidenti­al candidate regularly mentioned these assassinat­ions on the campaign trail. That was former FARC commander Rodrigo Londoño — whose guerrilla group once terrorized these same population­s. Londoño has since dropped out of the race for health reasons.

Deputy Attorney General María Paulina Riveros has recognized the “systematic” political nature of the killings, assuring Colombians that her office would investigat­e “all punishable acts.”

But Colombia’s minister of defense has insinuated — inexplicab­ly — that the murders were crimes of passion.

Currently, just 70 percent of the activists’ murders are under investigat­ion. No perpetrato­r has been identified in the vast majority of cases.

In our assessment, paramilita­ries — an umbrella term that describes many of the illegal militia and organized crime groups that did not disband during Colombia’s peace process — are the likely culprit. Almost 80 percent of all death threats against activists have been traced back to them.

Kill activists, kill Colombia’s peace agreement

The government’s tepid response to this wave of violence may turn out to be shortsight­ed.

Implementa­tion of the accords has been slow, largely because the government lacks the capacity to carry out its ambitious initiative­s in parts of the country where, historical­ly, it has exerted little control. President Juan Manuel Santos needs help to get his controvers­ial peace deal to take root nationwide.

Leaders from indigenous groups, Afro-Colombian communitie­s and coca farmers — which together comprise 24 percent of Colombia’s population, according to Colombian census data — could be critical allies in this process.

The community organizers under threat come from the conflict zones where the state is still struggling to enforce peace. They are human rights activists who are experts in the land conflicts and criminal economies of these regions. And, unlike the central government, our fieldwork has found, people actually trust them.

If the killings in Colombia aren’t stopped, a generation of potential leaders is facing exterminat­ion.

lation to do just that. Thune’s bill is a simple trade: It would extend the DACA program indefinite­ly, in exchange for $25 billion in border-security funding. This should be a no-brainer for Democrats. If they were to refuse, they would have to explain to dreamers why stopping Trump from building a wall is more important than protecting their ability to stay in the United States.

Historical­ly, Democrats and Republican­s have agreed that a nation-state needs to control its own borders. It is a national-security imperative, a law enforcemen­t imperative and a fiscal imperative. Only in the age of Trump have Democrats taken opposition to border security to such an absurd extreme. They shouldn’t sacrifice the well-being of real people (DACA recipients) over their opposition to a symbol (the wall).

If Democrats rejected such an offer, it would expose the crass way they are holding the DACA recipients hostage for political gain. And if, by some miracle, Democrats did agree to such a deal, it would be a confidence-building step that might make further bipartisan action on immigratio­n possible.

This should be a no-brainer for the president as well. Polls have shown that nearly 9 in 10 Americans want DACA recipients to stay, and Trump himself has repeatedly said he wants to find a way for them to remain in the country. So why would Trump choose to take responsibi­lity for the failure to reach a DACA deal that would let them stay, rather than keeping the blame right where it belongs — with Democrats?

After Trump’s “no deal” tweet, Democrats were quick to blame Trump. Sen. Kamala D. Harris (D-Calif.) responded on Twitter by declaring “this Administra­tion doesn’t want a solution for Dreamers. They want red meat for their base.” It’s ironic, but that is precisely the Democrats’ immigratio­n strategy. Trump should call them on it, by making them an offer they can’t refuse.

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