Dazzling rise, tragic fall of Mohammed bin Nayef
WASHINGTON — A grim new chapter in the Saudi “Game of Thrones” battle for control of the kingdom appears to be underway, as Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman prepares corruption and disloyalty charges against his predecessor and onetime rival, former crown prince Mohammed bin Nayef — a man who was once the United States’ champion in the war against Islamist terrorism.
Saudi and U.S. sources say that the anti-corruption committee organized by MBS, as the crown prince is known, is nearing completion of a detailed investigation of allegations that MBN, as the former crown prince is often called, improperly diverted billions of Saudi riyals through a network of front companies and private accounts while he was running Saudi counterterrorism programs at the Interior Ministry. MBN served there as chief assistant to his father, Prince
Nayef, and then succeeded him as minister from 2012 to 2017.
An associate of MBN’s said Saudi investigators have demanded that he repay $15 billion they claim he stole, though it isn’t clear how they reached that number. The associate, like some others contacted for this article, requested anonymity because of the sensitivity of the matter.
MBN’s supporters say these charges are false — and are contradicted by a 2007 royal decree from King Abdullah that authorized all of MBN’s activities and provided for a detailed annual report on his spending. Internal Saudi documents provided by an associate of MBN’s and reviewed by The Post support MBN’s contention that his secret financial activities were approved, at least in broad outlines, by the late king, who was succeeded in 2015 by MBS’s father, Salman.
A secret decree issued Dec. 27, 2007, bearing Abdullah’s distinctive signature, affirms that “the assistant to the minister of the interior [MBN] will continue in … managing this fund and expenses for it in ways that support counterterrorism efforts.” The decree also authorizes MBN to create “appropriate vehicles in the private sector” to disguise sensitive activities. The decree specifies that MBN “is to brief us at the end of every fiscal year” about spending from the secret fund.
A 2013 report from MBN to Abdullah, reviewed by The Washington Post, summarizes secret counterterrorism spending that fiscal year. The document, dated May 20, 2013, requests approval to spend 5 billion Saudi riyals (about $1.3 billion) on eight projects, including 378 million riyals for “secret airports,” 1.6 billion riyals for “aviation transport services” and 1.5 billion riyals for security “resources,” such as weapons. (“Secret airports” may refer to a project disclosed by the BBC in February 2013 to build a drone base in the kingdom two years before.)
A Saudi official who has worked closely with MBS on the investigation of MBN didn’t respond to two text messages requesting comment. A spokesman for the Saudi Embassy in Washington also didn’t respond to a request for comment.
To manage operations securely, MBN decided to create a network of what the CIA calls “proprietaries,” nominally private companies that are used to conduct covert operations. The network of front companies was managed through Sakab Saudi Holding Company, based in Riyadh.
Former CIA officials say they were aware of MBN’s control of such secret counterterrorism accounts at the time and used them to help fund joint U.S.-Saudi projects.
John Brennan, a former CIA director who worked closely with MBN for more than a decade, explained in an interview: “The Interior Ministry was provided with a budget so they could build up capabilities, recruit personnel and develop intelligence service contacts to penetrate al-Qaida … Abdullah’s view was that he had to be invested in the activities that MBN was leading. MBN was one of his favorites.”
As for the allegation that MBN skimmed money from intelligence accounts, Brennan said: “Over the course of my interaction with MBN, he wasn’t someone I thought was engaged in corrupt activity or was siphoning off money.”
When Abdullah died in January 2015, MBN understood that his privileged position had ended, and in mid-2015, he began liquidating his secret network of companies by transferring ownership to the Saudi Public Investment Fund, the kingdom’s sovereign wealth fund.
The last chapters of MBN’s story have a sad inevitability: He simply wasn’t a match for MBS in his ability to protect his friends and punish his enemies. MBS forced the crown prince to resign in June 2017 — and took his place.
The squeeze tightened. The former crown prince’s wife and daughters were banned from travel abroad. Authorities seized 21 billion riyals ($5.6 billion) in MBN’s liquid family assets, including 17.8 billion riyals in personal holdings and 3.1 billion riyals that were related to Sakab, according to the MBN associate.
On March 6, MBN was arrested along with his uncle, Prince Ahmed. A royal court official told senior princes that the two had been plotting a coup and would be tried for treason.
Many American intelligence officers who worked with MBN regard him still as a hero who helped save his country when it was mortally threatened. They recall the motto of the Mabahith, the modern security service that MBN did so much to create: “A homeland we don’t protect, we don’t deserve to live in.”