USA TODAY International Edition

THE REAL CHOICE ON NORTH KOREA

With Pyongyang on the brink of a nuclear breakout, is the military really an option?

- Robert S. Litwak Robert S. Litwak, director of internatio­nal security studies at the Wilson Center, is the author of Preventing North Korea’s Nuclear Breakout.

North Korea’s impressive parade of nuclearcap­able ballistic missiles last weekend occurred as the Trump administra­tion asserted it was not ruling out any option to address this rising threat. With echoes of Cuba in 1962, this slow- motion missile crisis will play out not in Robert F. Kennedy’s legendary Thirteen

Days, but over the next two or three years.

North Korea crossed the nuclear threshold a decade ago when it conducted its first atomic test. The precipitan­t of the current crisis is that the Pyongyang regime is now on the brink of vastly expanding its small nuclear arsenal. Left on its trajectory, by 2020, North Korea could have a nuclear stockpile of 100 warheads that can be mounted on longrange ballistic missiles capable of reaching the United States.

The contrast between North Korea’s atomic arsenal ( which could, incredibly, approach half the size of Britain’s) and its paltry economy ( a gross domestic product of about $ 17 billion, comparable with Asheville, N. C.) is jarring. North Korea is essentiall­y a failed state on the verge of a nuclear breakout. And this totalitari­an state is run by a dynastic cult — the Kim family.

‘ STRATEGIC PATIENCE’ Vice President Pence declared in South Korea on Monday that the Obama administra­tion’s policy of “strategic patience” was over — but he did not indicate what would follow.

Strategic patience had essentiall­y resulted in acquiescen­ce as North Korea built up its nuclear arsenal and made substantia­l progress in miniaturiz­ing warheads and acquiring an interconti­nental ballistic missile capability. In response, the United Nations and the United States have imposed still stricter sanctions on the Kim regime. But sanctions are not a strategy.

With North Korea perilously close to becoming a major nuclear power, America should pivot to serious diplomacy. Since the end of the Cold War, when the North Korean atomic challenge arose, U. S. hard- liners have eschewed diplomacy toward this “rogue state” because they view it as tantamount to appeasemen­t.

The alternativ­e to diplomacy — the much discussed military option “on the table” — has essentiall­y been off the table because it runs the catastroph­ic risk of spiraling into a second ( this time, nuclear) Korean war. No U. S. president could authorize even a “limited” strike on a missile site and discount this escalatory risk. When the United States can’t bomb and won’t negotiate, it is in fact acquiescin­g to a continued North Korean buildup. That prospect reinforces the case for transactio­nal diplomacy through coercive engagement.

Though a full rollback of North Korea’s atomic program is not a realistic goal, transactio­nal diplomacy to freeze its capabiliti­es might be attainable. When zero warheads is not an option, an agreement capping North Korea at 20 nuclear weapons is better than an unconstrai­ned program that hits 100 warheads by 2020.

A freeze also would preclude the testing that North Korea still needs to master miniaturiz­ation and reliable long- range missiles.

CHINA’S CALCULUS Why should diplomacy succeed this time when it has failed in the past? New conditions that change China’s strategic calculus.

Until now, Beijing has been lackadaisi­cal in its enforcemen­t of sanctions and has declared that Pyongyang was Washington’s problem. But a North Korea with a large atomic arsenal and ballistic missiles capable of striking the U. S. homeland would be a game changer. That’s true not only for America but also for China, where risky consequenc­es could include the possibilit­y of South Korea and Japan reassessin­g their own non- nuclear intentions.

Transactio­nal diplomacy would decouple the nuclear issue from regime change. It would create the conditions for success by identifyin­g a point of nearterm optimizati­on among the parties.

A freeze would permit Pyongyang to retain a minimum deterrent and the Kim family regime. For Beijing, it would preserve a strategic buffer state and avert the adverse strategic consequenc­es of a nuclear- armed North Korea. And for Washington, a near- term interim agreement freezing North Korean capabiliti­es would prevent a breakout and be characteri­zed as the first step toward long- term denucleari­zation of the Korean Peninsula.

This analytical option should be put to the diplomatic test. Otherwise, we are left with the bad options of bombing or acquiescin­g.

 ?? WONG MAYE- E, AP ?? Military experts say what appear to be North Korean interconti­nental ballistic missiles are paraded in Pyongyang Saturday.
WONG MAYE- E, AP Military experts say what appear to be North Korean interconti­nental ballistic missiles are paraded in Pyongyang Saturday.

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