USA TODAY International Edition
4 REASONS TO STAY IN IRAN DEAL
It’s risky to play around with an agreement that keeps Iran’s finger off the nuclear trigger.
President Trump has certified for the second time that Iran is in compliance with the 2015 nuclear accord that limits its nuclear program. But the leaks and background briefings surrounding his statement, followed by new sanctions announced Tuesday, sent unmistakable signals: The decision was grudging, Trump is increasingly unhappy with Iran and the deal, and he may be looking for a way out.
This is potentially playing with fire. The Iranian regime is repressive, a serial human rights abuser and expanding its influence in the region. But unless Iran cheats big time on the agreement, there are four good reasons why the administration would be well advised not to abandon it or try to push Iran to do so.
Signaling can be dangerous. The president’s certification is required every 90 days. The atmospherics around this one seemed like a warning that the next time might be different. The White House put out the story that Trump spent 55 minutes of an hour- long meeting arguing against certification and that he’d been talked into approving it the first time in April. Administration officials mentioned the additional sanctions and said they intended to strengthen enforcement.
Sometimes signaling an adversary can be effective. In this case, given the gap between Trump’s tough words on Iran and the absence of much tougher actions, it’s likely to be seen as an empty threat. Former national security adviser Michael Flynn famously put Iran on notice back in January; and yet whether it’s in Syria, Iraq or the Gulf, the administration seems to want to avoid a conflict with Iran on the ground.
Pulling out brings no advantages. It’s hard to see what the administration gains if it goads Iran into walking away. The United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, China and the European Union are not going to rally behind more sanctions; to the contrary, they are encouraging lucrative business deals with Iran. Maintaining support for the existing Iranian sanctions regime will be even more difficult if there is a perception that America’s behavior killed the agreement.
The Israeli government opposed the nuclear agreement and tried to torpedo it. But an unshackled Iranian nuclear program would stir anxiety in Tel Aviv. Nor would our friends in the Persian Gulf, with the possible exception of Saudi Arabia, cheer a collapse of the agreement. In fact, they would all come running to the United States for reassurances. Simply put, a U. S.- engineered end to the agreement would cause a train wreck with our allies and hand Russia and China new opportunities to extend their influence. It would also push international respect for America’s global leadership to a new low.
Who needs another nuclear rogue state? The last thing the beleaguered White House needs is to re- open the nuclear file with Iran. The U. S. strategy for ending North Korea’s nuclear ( and missile) programs is bankrupt. Tightening the sanctions screw is not working because China won’t bring North Korea to heel. There are no good military options. The White House refuses to negotiate with North Korea and clings to the illusory goal that the country can be denuclearized.
An Iranian decision to withdraw from the nuclear accord would not only overload the administration’s frayed circuits, it would also deal a serious blow to the global nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty ( NPT). Testing the White House’s crisis management capabilities isn’t an experiment any sane person would want to conduct.
Iran without nuclear weapons is a far less danger- ous adversary. The nuclear agreement is not perfect. When its main provisions expire in 10 to 15 years, Iran will have a free hand to resume the production of weapons- grade material and to develop nuclear weapons. Tehran’s continued testing of ballistic missiles, which is not constrained by the agreement, will give Iran the capability to deliver these weapons across the region.
This was, however, the best agreement that could be negotiated under the circumstances. It probably headed off a military confrontation pitting Israel and the United States against Iran, and it averted a serious blow to the NPT.
The administration needs to come up with a sensible strategy to confront Iran where it challenges core U. S. interests. But it is irresponsible to play around with an accord that is keeping Iran’s finger off the nuclear trigger. If Trump follows this course, the result could be an Iran with nuclear weapons, expanding its influence in the region.
Aaron David Miller, vice president at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and a former State Department adviser, is the author of The End of Greatness. Richard Sokolsky, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, served in the State Department for 37 years.