Another view: Do we need to weaken iPhone encryption?

Apple has historically assisted law enforcement, in possession of a warrant, with unlocking iPhones. Over time, that process changed whereby Apple would instead provide law enforcement with the evidence.

The case of the shooter in Pensacola, Florida, is interesting because iPhone unlocking solutions are available to law enforcement; GrayKey, from Grayshift, is one example.

While many law enforcement agencies and prosecutors may be content with reverting back to the old system of being provided with the evidence, the Department of Justice appears to be requesting some type of special access to decrypt the iPhone. There is no precedent to force a company to break its own encryption — hence the reemergence of the All Writs Act.

It begs the question: Do we really want to weaken encryption?

In a post- Snowden era, Apple, and other corporations, appear less willing to cooperate with government requests. Apple has removed itself from the decryption process.

Apple could still assist law enforcement by disabling security protocols on an individual iPhone to allow unlimited attempts to guess the password, making access to a phones data easier for the FBI.

Apple has not explicitly said it has opposed the idea of assisting law enforcement. In fact, Apple CEO Tim Cook previously hinted that congressional legislation may be the way forward for the two companies to formalize their cooperation.

We need congressional legislation to provide guidance about how companies must comply with court- approved warrants. Asking Apple to revert to providing evidence to investigators, without requesting an encryption backdoor, might be the best compromise.