Dole out for all an ‘even degree of unhappiness’
The defining moment in postWorld War II Italian politics came in the early 1990s, when hundreds of political leaders were indicted in the mani pulite (clean hands) corruption scandal that overturned the existing political structure. The upheaval opened the door for Silvio Berlusconi, a billionaire real estate and media tycoon, to rise to power.
Berlusconi was prime minister for nine of 17 years and a vocal opposition figure when out of office. But he was dogged by legal problems, scandal, cronyism and inefficiencies. And Italy became increasingly polarized by those who loved and hated him.
By the time he resigned in 2011, he had become highly unpopular. Italy’s credit rating had been downgraded multiple times, the economy was contracting, the political system had stalled, and the country was on the verge of defaulting on its debt.
The man Italians chose to end the divisiveness and fix things was Mario Monti, a well-regarded economist who had until then rejected overtures to get into politics. But, he said, “I really didn’t think I could say ‘no’ because the crisis had grown so dire. If I would have said ‘no’ I would have had to leave Italy for the rest of my life because I would have been so ashamed.”
Monti used Italy’s financial crisis to get all sides talking. He doled out an “even degree of unhappiness, well measured” for everyone. “The political parties, the social partners and trade unions were ready to accept temporary sacrifices that would have been otherwise unthinkable,” he said.
The plan mostly worked. Monti, more a technocrat than a politician, served for nearly 18 months. By the time he left, the economy had stabilized, interest rates were low, and the risk of default had been avoided.
Former prime minister Mario Monti is president of Bocconi University and a senator for life.
“When I took control of the government, there were three emergencies, really. One was the financial situation and the risk of default. Another was the growing gap between public opinion and the politicians. And the third — within the parties in parliament — there was no compromise.
“The centerright, headed by Mr. Berlusconi, and the center-left, headed by Mr. (Pier Luigi) Bersani, wouldn’t even speak to each other. The situation was such that people, from the man on the street to other capitals, worried that the Italian state might not be able to pay salaries and pensions. And we had in front of us the devastating example of Greece.
“What helped was this financial emergency, the sense of acute emergency, made all the political parties, the social partners and trade unions ready to accept temporary sacrifices that would have been otherwise unthinkable. And I was leveraging on this basis.
“I am sure I would not have been the one called to do the job (if there were only a political crisis). The country needed somebody because of past experience — and I hope some accumulated credibility — whose mere appointment would help calm the markets and collect a high degree of (international) support.
“It would have been unimaginable for me to be asked to be only a political healer of the country.”