Obama has struck the right balance
The U.S. could conceivably have done things in Syria beyond what it did. The U.S. began with crushing sanctions to bankrupt President Bashar Assad’s supporters, diplomatic isolation and efforts to build up external opposition. These efforts eventually morphed into military support for the armed opposition.
Beyond these considerable actions, what could have been done to bring about a democratic transition in Syria?
The answer depends in part on the regime’s staying power and the stake that its friends have in keeping it in place. Likewise, it would depend on the cohesion of the armed opposition and the sort of Syria that they are fighting to create.
Another factor is U.S. strategic interest. Does the U.S. have more interest in deposing Assad than Assad’s friends have in keeping him in power? It’s important to think this through.
Given the regime’s fear of annihilation should it lose; the clear commitment of Russia, Iran and Hezbollah to support it; the failure of the moderate opposition to prevail quickly; and foreign fighters entering the fray, the U.S. would have had to intervene massively and probably with ground forces to dislodge Assad.
But there was never a Washington consensus that such a commitment was in U.S. interest and no consensus that U.S. intervention would have produced the kind of political outcome that the long-suffering Syrian people deserve.
For the U.S., killing a tyrant is relatively easy. Ask Saddam Hussein or Moammar Gadhafi. But reconstituting the politics and infrastructure of a country is hard. The U.S. tried for a decade in Iraq, spent an estimated $4 trillion and then had to re-intervene.
Given these constraints, the most feasible course was humanitarian assistance, removal of most of Syria’s chemical weapons and moving to destroy the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, a process now well underway.
A president must balance strategic priorities and assess the public support needed to finish what is started. President Obama struck such a balance.