Memos detail Cuba invasion plan
Kennedy considered proposed 261,000 troops to remove Fidel Castro
WASHINGTON – U.S. military planners estimated they would need 261,000 troops and between 10 to 15 days to invade Cuba, oust its dictator, Fidel Castro, and take control over the country, an Aug. 8, 1962, memo for the John F. Kennedy administration shows.
“In order to seize control of key strategic areas in Cuba within 10-15 days with minimum casualties to both sides about 261,000 US military personnel would participate in the operation,” said the memo to the “Special Group” developing plans to remove Castro.
The memo was one of nearly 2,900 files released Thursday by the National Archives as part of the final disclosure of files collected in the investigation of Kennedy’s assassination.
While this and other documents had nothing to do with the assassination, it was included in the files because of the connection between Kennedy’s desire to remove Castro from power, his support of Cuban exiles to help him and the affinity of suspected assassin Lee Harvey Oswald for the Castro government.
The memo about Cuba invasion planning had specific troop numbers, the duration of the invasion, the type of weapons and military units to be used and the location of forces censored when it was released previously.
Operation Mongoose
A failed invasion of Cuba by exile soldiers in April 1961 embarrassed the new Kennedy administration, and the president chose his brother, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, to lead a series of operations aimed at destabilizing or overthrowing the Castro regime.
Perhaps the most significant plan was a covert plan involving the Kennedy administration called Operation Mongoose, which was detailed in many of the documents included in the latest release. They include:
A March 12, 1962, memo that spelled out some of the forces to be used to invade Cuba, which included Navy landing craft to back CIA crews, Air Force cargo aircraft, and submarines used for “black broadcast operations.”
A March 14, 1962 memo from Air Force Brig. Gen. Edward Lansdale that detailed the need for the special Air Force cargo planes and Navy PT boats for raids on Cuban coastal positions.
A March 1962 briefing paper for Robert Kennedy that warned of possible Soviet military bases in Cuba. “They can make the decision to establish military bases in Cuba at their will and pleasure and if they exercise this option, we would likely be unable to remove them without initiating World War III.”
The minutes of a March 21, 1962, meeting of the Caribbean Survey Group that included Robert Kennedy and top CIA and military officials. Newly revealed sections of that document include Kennedy asking about kidnapping “some of the key people of the Communist regime,” the risks involved in using unmarked Air Force planes and whether “British-controlled and other foreign areas” could be used to stage U.S. forces to invade Cuba.
By August, the administration had a more detailed invasion plan. The Aug. 8, 1962, plan included using 71,000 soldiers and 35,000 Marines in Cuba and another 29,000 soldiers in support.
Cuban Missile Crisis
On Oct. 16, 1962, President Kennedy was informed that U.S. military reconnaissance planes flying over Cuba detected signs of Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles, armed with nuclear warheads, on the island.
That precipitated a 13-day crisis in which the Kennedy administration wrangled with the Soviet Union. In the end, the United States declared a naval blockade, the Soviets agreed to remove the missiles, and the United States removed its missiles in Turkey.
As he debated the U.S. response with his key advisers, Kennedy had military plans for a Cuban invasion at the ready. They included using the Guantanamo naval base as a staging area “for limited covert operational purposes including agent infiltration/exfiltration, support for clandestine maritime operations, and for holding and interrogating Cuban agents and suspects,” according to an Aug. 14, 1962, plan.
The Guantanamo portions of that memo showed that the Pentagon and State Department objected to the CIA’s plans to use the base.
On Nov. 17, 1962, after the crisis had passed, an Air Force plan showed the extent of attack aircraft available to attack Cuba. Gen. Curtis LeMay, the Air Force chief of staff, had argued for a U.S. attack on the missile bases. His postcrisis plan showed there were 1,456 aircraft and 355 missiles, including 80 Polaris missiles on nuclear submarines, available to strike Cuba.