Multiple mistakes led to fatal Niger attack

Pentagon cites training and command deficiencies in October 2017 ambush

The four U.S. soldiers killed in a militant ambush in Niger last year were victims of command mistakes, insufficient training and ultimately a surprise attack by a well-trained and better-armed force, the Pentagon said Thursday.

An eight-page report summarizes an investigation, and a full report will follow, said Marine Corps Gen. Thomas Waldhauser, commander of U.S. Africa Command.

Waldhauser said at a Pentagon news conference that changes have been made to better prepare and protect U.S. troops across Africa. “I take ownership of all the events connected to the ambush of 4 October,” he said. “The responsibility is mine.”

Defense Secretary Jim Mattis ordered a broad review of training, operating procedures and planning to be completed within four months. Waldhauser said troops are being better armed and trained for their mission — training and equipping local troops, as opposed to directly confronting enemy targets. “We are now far more prudent in our missions,” he said.

Killed were Army Sgt. La David Johnson, 25, of Miami Gardens, Fla.; Staff Sgt. Bryan Black, 35, of Puyallup, Wash.; Staff Sgt. Jeremiah Johnson, 39, of Springboro, Ohio; and Staff Sgt. Dustin Wright, 29, of Lyons, Ga.

“We cannot overstate the courage with which our forces fought,” said Army Maj. Gen. Roger Cloutier, chief of staff for U.S. Africa Command and lead investigating officer.

The battle near the village of Tongo Tongo prompted the investigation into whether the soldiers had sufficient weaponry, ammunition and training for the mission in the West African nation. The investigative team interviewed 143 people, including survivors of the attack.

The troops were hunting for a highranking Islamic State militant, but their leaders submitted a less dangerous mission for command approval, the report says. The capture-or-kill mission required approvals higher up the chain of command than it received, Cloutier said.

The report describes a “contradictory and ambiguous” command approval system. It cites “a general lack of situational awareness and command oversight at every echelon.”

The militant was not found, and the troops were sent on an intelligencegathering mission. They stopped at Tongo Tongo, and the ambush came shortly after they left the village.

The report says the troops had little time to train together or with Nigerian forces and did not complete standard pre-mission drills.

“Although the report details the compounding impact of tactical and operational decisions, no single failure or deficiency was the sole reason for the events,” the report says.