Report cites failure in Afghanistan
Inspector general: Billions wasted, thousands killed, corruption thrives
WASHINGTON – The U.S. government’s 17-year effort to stabilize parts of war-torn Afghanistan has mostly failed, according to a report released Thursday by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction.
The damning report finds that much of the $4.7 billion spent on programs to stabilize areas cleared of insurgents was largely wasted — some of it siphoned off by corrupt officials, some of it paying for projects that did more harm than good. All told, the U.S. government has appropriated about $126 billion to rebuild the country, most of it to train and equip security forces.
“The large sums of stabilization dollars the United States devoted to Afghanistan in search of quick gains often exacerbated conflicts, enabled corruption and bolstered support for insurgents,” the report says.
After toppling the ruling Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001, U.S., allied and Afghan forces sought to establish a stable country where al-Qaeda terrorists would find no harbor.
Thursday’s report follows one issued this week by the Pentagon’s inspector general that found little progress in providing security for the Afghan people.
According to Thursday’s report, bad strategy and policies in Afghanistan led to billions wasted, more than 2,200 U.S. troops killed and a dysfunctional country left behind. The problems stemmed in part from U.S. officials focusing efforts on the most dangerous parts of the country and seeking to get out too fast.
President Obama sent 50,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan in 2009 and 2010 to the most dangerous parts of Afghan- istan. At the same time Obama ordered more forces to Afghanistan, he set a deadline for their withdrawal. This “surge,” patterned in part after a similar escalation in Iraq, was intended to tamp down the Taliban insurgency and allow the government to grow, but the strategy did not provide enough security, nor did it last long enough to allow Afghans to take over.
Instead of bolstering the government, the gusher of cash flooded the impoverished country with money that could not be spent fast enough.
Of the $4.7 billion spent, $2.4 billion went to programs administered by USAID and $2.3 billion was spent on the Pentagon’s Commander’s Emergency Response Program.
The military measured success in how much money was spent rather than its impact, according to the report. The commander’s funds, money that officers in the field could dole out for projects, rose from $40 million in 2004 to $550 million in 2009.
Deadlines for drawing down troops and leaving Afghanistan entirely in 2014, a goal that wasn’t achieved, eroded belief in the staying power of the U.S.-led coalition and the Afghan government.
“Stabilization requires time to measure and adapt, and we lost all that,” John Allen, the former top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, told investigators. “It was pulled out from under us.”
About 15,000 U.S. troops remain in Afghanistan.
“Stabilization requires time to measure and adapt, and we lost all that. It was pulled out from under us.”
John Allen Former top U.S. commander in Afghanistan