Report: Leaders unclear during riot

Poor responses to prison disturbance noted

Editor’s note: This is the fourth of a five-part series based on the final reports issued by the Arizona Department of Corrections after an investigation on the March 1 riot at the state prison near San Luis, Ariz.

Following an investigation into the March 1 prison riot in San Luis, Ariz., reports from the Arizona Department of Corrections describe the challenges and failures that occurred during response to the disturbance.

One the biggest challenges was that many staff members didn’t know who was in charge and the person in charge was not giving direction.

The Disturbance Assessment Report and Operational Review Report contain the final findings following the investigation of the riot at the Arizona State Prison Complex-Yuma’s medium-custody Cheyenne Unit,

which resulted in the death of one inmate. The report outlines some of the key findings.

It took about 2 1/2 hours to get control of the inmate population. However, the incident command system, which requires the establishing of an incident commander, operations, branches, divisions and groups, was not established until after the disturbance was under control.

The report indicates that some staff believed that Sgt. Christy Roach was the incident commander, while others believed Deputy Warden Gerardo Zaragoza or Lt. Rosas (first name not given) was the incident commander.

The system, which requires each person involved in incident operations to be assigned to only one supervisor, was not deployed. The investigative team noted that several administrators and supervisors gave order to multiple staff outside their scope of control.

Some staff believed that Zaragoza was in command; however, none of the staff interviewed indicated that he provided any direction, the report says. An April 3 memorandum to ADC Director Charles Ryan from Southern Region Operations Director Joe Profiri notes that Zaragoza failed to effectively lead his team and had a “poor” response to the disturbance, both during and after the uprising.

“On the evening of the disturbance, the on-site Duty Officer briefed DW Zaragoza upon his arrival at the Unit. After the briefing, DW Zaragoza went to his office and closed the door. This is startlingly concerning because at the time of this behavior the disturbance was already in progress at his assigned Unit and he was a ranking administrator,” Profiri wrote.

He pointed out that if Zaragoza had immediately coordinated a response or negotiated with inmate leaders, the riot might have ended sooner.

“His absence and failure to take charge created ambiguity of command and delayed coordination of responders and deployment of tactics to regain control of his Unit that had been taken over by inmates,” Profiri said.

The ADC fired Zaragoza following the investigation.

These issues led to communication failures, which caused other complications. The security protocols for entrance into the unit were suspended and armed law enforcement responders entered unrestricted and without clearing metal detectors. Some of these outside first responders included the Yuma and San Luis police departments, U.S. Border Patrol, Yuma County Sheriff’s Office and other agencies.

During an interview, Major Robert Yesenski, complex chief of security, was asked why law enforcement officers were inside the perimeter. Yesenski said that he had no control of the responders. He has since been demoted to lieutenant.

In addition, the report says, the pedestrian sally port doors were overridden and all doors were opened, allowing security staff from other units to self-dispatched to multiple areas.

Issuance of weapons and ammunition was unregulated. Staff reported going to the armory with instructions to “bring all of the ammunition,” and once it was delivered, “whoever needed it, took it.” Full accountability of munitions didn’t occur until a week after the incident.

The report also indicates that the Tactical Support Unit failed to assemble and plan a tactical assault prior to taking action because part of the team was already engaged in defensive tactics.

However, the report stresses that staffing did not play a negative role in this disturbance. The swing shift was staffed with 33 correctional officers, which is considered “very good.”

The report and related exhibits are posted and available for download in the Reports section of the ADC website.