SPACE SHUTTLE CHALLENGER DISASTER
…Lessons for all of us in Decision Making Positions
CAPE Canaveral, Florida, United States of America, January 28, 1986 - Space Shuttle Challenger (STS-51-L) majestically lifted off her launch pad at 11:38 local time watched by millions of expectant viewers. Aboard the Shuttle was High School Teacher Christa McAuliffe who was flying as part of the Teacher in Space Project and was scheduled to deliver her lesson from the space to High School Students on day four of the Space journey.
STS-51-L was delivering a Tracking and Data Relay Satellite and the Spartan Satellite to observe Halley’s Comet.
Total on board was seven. Seventy-three seconds into the flight, Challenger exploded over the Atlantic Ocean killing all on board leaving millions of viewers and NASA Officials devasted. Some viewers wept uncontrollably.
As stated in my last week article, the material I started sharing appears as case studies in post graduate lessons covering Organisational Culture, Decision Making Processes, Communication, Work Place Ethics, Whistle Blowing, Dangers of Group Thinking, and Engineering Safety among others.
Apart from the Voyage Endurance Case Study, the Space Shuttle Challenger Case Study was one of most touching lessons that gripped my heart when my Professor brought it in our PhD class.
The tragedy was blamed on Organizational Culture and Decision-Making Processes.
According to Wikipedia, STS-51-L was scheduled to launch on January 22, but was delayed to January 25. Adverse weather condition forced further delays.
STS-51-L launch was postponed on three consecutive days from January 25, when weather conditions exceeded limits for a transoceanic abort landing, and January 27, when an issue with the hatch handle was coupled with high winds at the Kennedy Space Centre (KSC) Shuttle Landing Facility that exceeded limits for a return to launch site abort.
While it was outside on the launch pad, the Space Shuttle was exposed to 18 cm of rainfall. It was also reportedly icy cold. The launch was scheduled for 09:38 hours local time on January 28 but was delayed for two hours to allow ice to melt. At 11:38:00 STS-51-L launched from the Kennedy Space Centre in Florida, United States of America.
Seventy-three seconds into the flight, Challenger exploded and debris fell in the Atlantic Ocean killing everyone on board. Decision to launch
With the weather forecasts predicting record-low temperatures for a Space Shuttle launch, a conference call was set up on the evening of January 27 by Cecil Houston, the manager of the KSC office of the Marshall Space Flight Centre, to discuss the safety of the launch.
Morton-Thiokol (Technical Contractor) Engineers expressed their concerns about the effect of low temperatures on the resilience of the rubber O-rings in the Rocket Boosters. With colder temperatures lowering the elasticity of the rubber O-rings, the engineers feared that the O-rings would not expand to form a seal at the time of launch; a development which could lead to a tragedy. When quizzed by NASA Officials to provide more basis to support their fears, the engineers argued that they did not have enough data to determine if the O-rings would seal at temperatures colder than 12 °C; the coldest launch of the Space Shuttle up to that date.
In particular, Robert Lund, the then Vice President of Engineering at Morton-Thiokol, stated that the launch should not occur until the temperature was above 12 °C, and was supported by Joe Kilminster, the then Vice President of the Space Booster Programmes at Morton-Thiokol.
Surprisingly, the conference call decided to take a break for some time to allow for some offline discussion. A lot of things can happen during offline sessions.
Off the record consultations among key decision makers can lead to pre-agreed decisions being imposed on a meeting. In some cases, it can even be agreed who would move a motion and what must be said.
When the conference call resumed, Morton-Thiokol leadership changed their opinion and stated that the evidence presented on the failure of the O-rings was inconclusive and that there was a substantial margin of error in the event of a failure.
They stated that their decision was to proceed with the launch. They submitted a recommendation for launch signed by a senior executive after someone who was supposed to sign became unavailable.
White House response
On January 28, 1986, President Ronald Reagan was scheduled to give the 1986 State of the Union Address in the evening. After the tragedy earlier in the day, President Reagan postponed the State of the Union Address and instead addressed the nation on the Challenger disaster.
In the coming days, the disaster got heavily politicised with US elected officials accusing some White House officials of having pressured NASA to proceed with the launch despite professional advice from the contractor not to do so. The basis of the accusation was anchored on views that President Reagan had intended to generate political capital out of a successful launch in the scheduled national address.
The offline consultations which took place during a conference call between NASA Officials and the Contractor; Morton Thiokol became a sticky point.
Three weeks before the State of the Union Address, NASA officials were alleged to have suggested that Reagan should mention Challenger launch and Christa McAuliffe's flight in his upcoming speech.
In April 1986, the White House released a report that concluded there had been no pressure from President Reagan for NASA to launch Challenger prior to the State of the Union.
THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY
The Rogers Commission, a special commission appointed by President Reagan to investigate the accident concluded that NASA’s Organisational Culture and its Decision-Making Processes had been key contributing factors to the accident with the Agency violating its own safety rules.
In addition, the Agency was found to have disregarded warnings from Engineers about dangers of launching in the cold temperature of that day and failure to adequately report those technical concerns to superiors.
The Agency was also found to have failed to address O-ring challenges from Morton Thiokol despite knowing about it since 1977. Challenger had 9 successful flights before the tragedy. There are many lessons to learn from this tragedy. *Johnstone Chikwanda is an energy expert and a Fellow of the Engineering Institute of Zambia, a PhD candidate at Johnson University, Knoxville, Tennessee, USA.
STS-51-L STS-51-L launch was postponed on three consecutive days from January 25, when weather conditions exceeded limits for a transoceanic abort landing, and January 27, when an issue with the hatch handle was coupled with high winds at the Kennedy Space Centre (KSC) Shuttle Landing Facility that exceeded limits for a return to launch site abort.