Attack on NSO HQ revisited

THIS week we continue talking to former National Security Organisation (NSO) Deputy Director of Public Security Cde Zephaniah Moyo pseudo name Jeckonia Zulu. Cde Moyo has spoken about the operations of the NSO, an intelligence unit during the armed struggle in Zambia which was headed by Dr Dumiso Dabengwa. Cde Moyo also touched on different issues such as the NSO structure, training, deployments and how it related with other liberation movements. Below are excerpts of the interview with our Assistant Editor Mkhululi Sibanda (MS).

MS: Then the attack on the NSO headquarters where according to a former Rhodesian officer in his book the mission was to capture Dumiso Dabengwa and other senior intelligence officers, Victor Mlambo and Gordon Butshe. What happened on that particular day in June 1979?

Cde Moyo: The NSO headquarters were located at Roma township in Lusaka. Early in the morning we heard a bang on the eastern side of the city and aircraft sounds. However, we were not at the house as anticipated by the Rhodesians. On that morning we had in fact seen three helicopters, one went down somewhere in Lusaka and the other came straight towards us, where Roma was. Gordon Butshe had left us earlier on with a driver. After the explosion I said to the now late Retired Brigadier-General Mhandu, usekuru whom we were together, “Let’s go and check at Roma.” Actually Butshe instinctively didn’t enter the house but chose to drive past, he was lucky as the enemy was waiting for whoever came in as some guys usually reported for duty around 7am. What we don’t know is whether the enemy had spent the night in one of the houses or they came on foot. But I think they were dropped off by a vehicle and they spent the night there. check. When we were approaching the area we decided not to use the usual way to the house. So we used the western route. As we were driving towards the house, on the right hand side there were no houses but were on the left. Mind you it was a residential area.

So when we were driving from a distance we saw people in the vicinity of our offices who were wearing black overalls, which were usually used by the Special Air Services and commandos. And we asked ourselves who those people were. Then all of a sudden one of the enemy soldiers turned towards us and was armed with a bazooka. They had painted their faces black and only through the hands could one tell that they were whites. I said guys, those are whites.

We were driving in a Peugeot, a civilian vehicle that’s why they didn’t realise us from afar. Suddenly there was a bang and luckily all the four of us had our doors opened and we were going down. The bazooka shell went through the vehicle and the car was torn apart. Kaizer and the driver went into a drain and smelted away. When I tried to flee I was caught by the belt of my AK-47 folded butt and I hurt my knee. I lay on the ground and tried to roll behind the vehicle and Mhandu started firing and I think he hit the white man who was sending another shell. Then a nearby electricity sub-station was hit and there was blue light and then dust. I also started firing, assisting Mhandu. While there was that skirmish we were not aware that a helicopter had landed inside our headquarters and that there were ground troops that had killed about nine of our guys. Those enemy forces, we were to learn later, stood on the wall and pointed at the door and all hit our comrades on the head when they tried to get out of the house. They used the bazooka to hit the locked gate.

MS: So now you and Mhandu were at the mercy of the enemy?

Cde Moyo: centre. They were coming straight to Roma. I said to Mhandu let us run. We fled and jumped into the yard of one of the houses. We went straight into the house and into a kitchen where we mounted and watched the helicopters circling around. Then we heard the sound of another helicopter taking off and that is when we realised it had landed inside our headquarters. It had one of our guys who was captured while one of our officers called Shantini, a Sibanda fellow made good his escape during the attack. He was shot at but went straight underneath the helicopter and jumped over the fence and was gone. He now lives in Esigodini. Another who survived jumped into a heap of tyres and pretended to be dead. After leaving our headquarters the Rhodesians went above Lusaka Police Station, and one of the policemen shot at one of the helicopters. They then went straight across Lusaka further than VC and landed there, I think they wanted to interrogate our officer before they left.

MS: I understand at the NSO headquarters they were also after your files. Obviously they got away with something.

Cde Moyo: when we realised that among documents they took were files with information on our two officers, Shadreck and Canaan Ncube, who is here in Bulawayo. Those two had been sent right inside Rhodesia for a spying mission and were in Bulawayo. They had done their duties efficiently and were able to send information back to Lusaka. And after the attack we had to send information that they evacuate as soon as possible and they were able to escape. If we had failed to get in touch with them within 24 hours, they were likely to get into trouble.

MS: Cde Moyo, as someone who was in the intelligence department what can you say about the forays that the enemy was making into Zambia? Some people might see a weakness on your part.

Cde Moyo: Our intelligence system was very much alive but it was limited. We didn’t have the mobility. We were largely operational in Zambia although we could sometimes send people into Zimbabwe. Some of the aircrafts we could detect while crossing the Zambezi River, that is why sometimes people survived during the attacks. However, at times the enemy fire power was too much such that there was nothing that we could have done, we tried our best. But my feeling is that we had the Zambian government which was the host country and it was supposed to help us. However, I believe some of the host country’s government officials were working in cahoots with the enemy, I stand to be corrected. Mind you, there were also Boers involved in farming activities in Zambia and these are the people who were working closely with units like the SAS and Selous Scouts. When you look at the attack on the residence of Dr Nkomo you find out that the vehicles that were used in that operation were designed and painted in Zambia. They had Zambian colours, so the enemy forces

enemy forces easily outmaneuvered the Zambian intelligence. We didn’t have much room to put into action our strategies, we were not an occupational force but a liberation movement housed in Zambia, so we were supposed to respect their laws. If they said they did not want certain types of weaponry like the case at FC we were supposed to abide by that. Anything above us, the air space belonged to the Zambian control and not us, so it was a tricky situation. MS: But were you well equipped as a force? Cde Moyo: We had the fire power. Zipra had evolved, remember we had tanks, we had trained pilots and the intelligence system was exceptional. Guerillas were being poured into operational areas, we were about to win the war. We were going for an outright military victory.

MS: Then there is this issue about the NSO that it was an instrument that was used to even deal with the so-called internal enemies. Even up to now when some people speak about Dabengwa and former NSO officers especially yourself, Cde Moyo they do so in hushed tones. Why is that so?

Cde Moyo: (Smiles). I am not sure why some were that afraid as we were all comrades but on different deployments. There was just that fear of the unknown. Some people thought that we were trained to kill, we were not. We were trained to monitor the army, the party, gather intelligence and to see that things were done above board. We were supposed to point out certain things if they were not going according to plan. Not to say that if we discovered that someone had erred then

he or she should be killed. That was not the case. However, the intelligence is the backbone of any sector. Intelligence is not for everyone, when you get information about your enemy you should know how to deal with such information, it’s delicate. Also if you are working in the intelligence you need to move closer to the enemy. You should try and know everything about the enemy and with intelligence you don’t just recruit anyone, you need the best brains available to you. Even when you infiltrate your opponents you don’t just go for the rank and swine, I mean the rank and file, you go for the cream and bring them to your side.

As for the NSO some of us understood why that department was created. It was at a point when the struggle was growing and we had to create a formidable force with different departments and an intelligence which would look into the force and into the civilians. If you are a fighter you need to know whether people like what you are doing so you need information.

MS: But there are accusations that the NSO would send its officers to the front to eliminate field commanders who were viewed as renegades. Is that true?

Cde Moyo: That was pure propaganda. The enemy was using information on our officers who were getting into the front and was spreading its propaganda. It was printing leaflets and dropping them in the operational areas saying certain field commanders should beware of the NSO as it was coming to assassinate them. That was the propaganda machinery being used. It is the way of using intelligence. However, anywhere in the world whoever is an intelligence operative that person is always a bad guy even to the leaders themselves. This is because an operative is capable of keeping surveillance and reporting on the people even from his side. Also in the guerrilla movement you are always suspicious of each other.