Unpacking DPRK’s nuclear policy
The DPRK’s new missile demonstrates that many of the problems bedevilling the international community are fairly universal; they are informed by the claims from states which pursue strategies of survival in the international community.
NORTH Korea, the DPRK, is a nuclear capable state. Most industrialised nations have the technical capability to develop nuclear weapons. The DPRK is one of the less developed nations which possess substantial nuclear technology.
It has been estimated that by August 1996, there were 439 nuclear power plants in 32 countries, supplying 17 percent of the world’s electricity (347 000MW electrical capacity; 2228 trillion watt-hours total in 1995).
Countries have continued to construct power reactors. The growth rate in nuclear power production has been placed at about 4,5 percent a year because of the efficiency of existing reactors.
The DPRK seems to benefit from the continuing industrialisation of Asia (and China in particular), coupled with the basically flat supply of petroleum and pressure to restrict fossil fuel burning in general. All this seems to assure a continued strong expansion of worldwide nuclear power.
With nuclear potential states such as Iran having signed bilateral agreements such as the US-Iran Nuclear Agreement in 2015, the hope the world over has been that countries like the DPRK would slow down on nuclear production. This should be done to further the interests of global peace and security.
President Obama’s negotiation team mounted the best argument - the deal with Iran would be, with time, “transformational” (Friedman, 2015). Iran would be open to the world if her sanctions are lifted. Is the DPRK making another statement in this regard?
Thanks to the Iran-US agreement, Iran, a nuclear-ready state, could have tested an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), it has been argued. This was notwithstanding the fact that Iran was arguing that the ICBM was not a military ICBM that would be used to deliver nuclear warheads, but was a peaceful Space Launch Vehicle (SPL) for orbiting satellites.
North Korea had a weekend launch of a new type of “medium long-range” ballistic rocket that can carry a heavy nuclear warhead. McCluskey (2014) argues that while the DPRK, and other countries such as Pakistan, India and Israel are “improving” their nuclear arsenals, the others such as the US, China, Japan, Russia and France are upgrading theirs.
The DPRK’s new missile demonstrates that many of the problems bedevilling the international community are fairly universal; they are informed by the claims from states which pursue strategies of survival in the international community.
The two-stage liquid-fuelled rocket is capable of flying up to 4 500 kilometres.
The purpose of the test was explained by the DPRK’s state news agency, KCNA, as meant to verify the capability to carry a “large-scale heavy nuclear warhead”.
The new missile flew 787 kilometres, reaching an altitude of 2 111 kilometres. With the test-fire apparently flying higher and for a longer time period than any other such previous missile, the international community must grapple with the significance of a range of possible factors that explain the DPRK’s nuclear policy.
The weekend launch justifiably drew condemnation from South Korea, and nuclear capable states such as Japan, the United States of America and Russia.
Sadly, North Korea’s Kim Jong Un wants more nuclear and missile tests.
He also warned that his country’s weapons could strike the US mainland and Pacific holdings.
The DPRK’s actions show that it has a nuclear agenda. Added to this is the detention of US citizens.
A quick survey of developments in some nuclear-capable states reveals the following. By the year 2000 Japan was projected to have an inventory of about 55 tonnes of separated reactor grade plutonium-enough to manufacture 10 000 warheads, more than the combined nominal arsenals of the US and Russia combined under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II).
South Korea considers that the DPRK, again a capable nuclear state, is making provocations which will be met with “stern responses”.
South Korea considers the development of the Korean Air and Missile Defence system to be the solution.
This system is to be used in lieu of the controversial US THAAD missile shield that China objects to as a threatening increase of American military capabilities in the region. South Korea’s new president, Ban Ki-moon, abandoned his campaign approach which hinged on the need to pursue negotiations and engagement with Pyongyang. He now wants conditional dialogue which “dialogue is possible only when North Korea changes its behaviour”.
The concerns from South Korea are simple. If the international community does nothing, levels of nuclear tests may continue to rise. The establishment of a virulent nuclear policy may again encourage nuclear-ready or nuclear potential states to join the nuclear-capable states.
If the international community begins to make bigger inroads into engaging Pyongyang, it may be able to do as South Korea suggests.
What few in the international community may fail to forget in the near future is that: innocently ignore the concerns of a neighbour of a nation that inexorably pursues a nuclear policy and the consequences are loudly clear.
Add the fears of a nuclear war in the equation - and Pyongyang’s and the hotspots of nuclear activity become as much international as they are national. The scale of what is expected of Pyongyang is the equivalent of Ban’s expectation for a Korean Peninsula. South Korea cannot become a deeply less confrontational state until it becomes a radically less threatened one.
Sharon Hofisi is contactable at sharonhofii@gmail.com and writes in his own personal capacity.