Dismissing conspiracy theories about China in Zim

More fundamentally, there is little evidence of China in the post-Mao era pushing for regime change in Africa. This includes countries where it has larger economic interests than in Zimbabwe, and where those are in considerably more danger than in Zimbabw

THE fall of former Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe has dominated global coverage of Africa over the past few weeks. In Western coverage of the first week after the “coup” in Zimbabwe, there was speculation about what China knew beforehand and whether Beijing played an active role in pushing for it.

China’s mention drowned out other notable external stakeholders such as the UK, the US, South Africa, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the African Union (AU).

And it almost threatened to overshadow the domestic dynamics that led to the changeover.

There are reasons to draw a direct parallel between China and the recent events in Zimbabwe.

The most obvious is the fact that army chief General Constantino Chiwenga visited Beijing shortly before the tanks rolled into Harare.

The timing of the visit was certainly eye-catching. It led to speculation that Beijing was informed beforehand of the coming “coup”.

There were also rumours that other external stakeholders, notably South Africa, had been informed.

Zimbabwe enjoys a historical friendship with China.

It’s a relationship that goes back to the Mao era and also involves Emmerson Mnangagwa, now president, who received military training in China.

But simply jumping from these facts to the implication that China actively pushed for, or orchestrated Mugabe’s fall, skips over a few important facts.

There are three reasons to dismiss the conspiracy theorists.

In the first place, China has strenuously denied any involvement in the change of government. This is worth noting, though it’s unlikely to convince those looking for a conspiracy.

More fundamentally, there is little evidence of China in the post-Mao era pushing for regime change in Africa. This includes countries where it has larger economic interests than in Zimbabwe, and where those are in considerably more danger than in Zimbabwe. South Sudan is one example.

For all Mugabe’s many “crimes”, Zimbabwe during his reign was relatively stable and predictable.

No matter how frosty the relationship between Harare and Beijing had become, Zimbabwe seems like an unlikely candidate for such a big departure in tactics.

This is especially true after the fall of Muammar Gaddafi, an event that pushed China even further away from support for interventionism.

Second, as the young, Hong Kongbased Zimbabwean academic Innocent Mutanga has argued, the Western fixation on a possible Chinese regime change plot has the effect of discounting African agency.

This is doubly problematic because it also discounts the ability of African governing bodies like SADC to enforce the rules in their own back yard.

In fact, the careful choreography that accompanied the ousting of Mugabe was clearly aimed at appeasing the AU. The aim was to avoid any invocation of the AU’s mandatory suspension of unconstitutional changes in government.

The regime change argument misses a wider point: that Chiwenga’s visit can be read as a sign of China’s new prominence on the global stage.

The fact that China was probably informed about the “coup” beforehand actually makes clear of its shifting geopolitical position.

Being given prior warning shows that China is getting recognition alongside the US and UK as a fully fledged great power.

This perspective should lead us to focus in detail on Chinese investments in Zimbabwe — not because they might point towards direct Chinese involvement in Mugabe’s fall, but because they raise questions about how various Chinese actors interact with illiberal governments across the global south.

Since 2006, the relationship between China and Zimbabwe has been anchored on cooperation between military and party elites on both sides.

This led prominent Chinese companies into lucrative mining contracts in collaboration with companies owned by the Zimbabwean military. One such Chinese company is the arms manufacturer Norinco.

In addition, large loan packages and prospective infrastructure investments have followed, broadening ties across sectors and society.

Full article on www.herald.co.zw