Mavonde battle decisive in liberation struggle
IN this third and final instalment, Cde Gidza, born GILBERT MUTYAMBIZI, relives the Mavonde Battle, which was a decisive phase of the liberation war as Ian Smith sought to leverage the Lancaster House negotiations on the battle. Had Mavonde gone to Smith, the negotiations in particular and the war in general could have taken another trajectory. Cde Gidza, the first base defence commander of Mavonde, walks down memory lane, to the six-day battle from 40 years ago. Read on . . .
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Q: You are quite a smoker, huh? (Cde Gidza had lit probably his last of the 20-pack cigarettes).
A: I am. Since the 70s, up to now. (laughing). I haven’t stopped smoking, and I am almost 68 now. The war forced us into all these things. It is not out of will. Now, we had been instructed, and the vehicles came — the double-diff vehicles, Scanias, quite versatile vehicles and quite dependable and it was the rainy season as we moved from Marizhondo to Mavonde. It was a battle moving overnight, it was really a battle.
The soils were loose, the soils were soggy and the vehicles would get stuck, and they are loaded with heavy artillery and ammunition. But the spirit of togetherness, of oneness, if that unity could return to Zimbabwe definitely this country would enjoy itself. We travelled the whole night until we got to Mavonde. There was a group of comrades who had gone to Mavonde to do the reconnaissance of the base area. Where we would deploy our weapons, disposition of bases, who would be positioned where. But upon arrival, when we looked at the map, we had some reservations about some of the positions.
We deliberated on these positions with the late General.
Q: You mean Tongogara?
A: No, no, Zvinavashe. I said let’s re-do some of these positions and we did them. I remember on return, it was around 1400hrs and we were being fed. Two helicopters came, and no weapons were mounted. Oh my God, all weapons are down except our personal weapons. I had a bazooka with me, an RPG2. I said, “Chief, let me hit them.” He said no, these people are going to Gorongoza, remember the Matsanga insurgency had already started in Gorongoza. They were going with supplies to Matsanga, remember they were a baby of the Rhodesian forces. And they passed, and they were laughing. They were at tree-top level, how they didn’t see us I don’t know, we were so many. It was quite a surprise. We breathed a sigh of relief when they passed. But the General said, “don’t think they haven’t seen us, they have seen us but their mission is Gorongoza”.
Then we started deploying. I sent my requisition to the General. I am the first base defence commander of Mavonde. The type of weapons, heavy weapons we wanted for the defence of Mavonde. We had weapons. We had come from Romania, we had weapons. Every group which came from Romania had weapons. Every group that came from training, came with weapons of sorts.
Q: Coming from Romania with weapons, were you using commercial flights or what?
A: There were designated planes for that. Remember, intel had to work. The enemy would be at work all the time, don’t forget the CIA, those guys of overt operations. Their ears would be open, eavesdropping on all communications.
Q: So these were like charter flights? To understand, how you would get weapons in, would you smuggle the weapons in or what?
A: Sort of. I wouldn’t know, all what we knew was to get onto the planes. It was not smuggling. The planes would come in with the weapons and off load as normal cargo. Remember it would be credited. There was no smuggling. It was a known cause which we were fighting for. Remember the United Nations knew there was a war in Rhodesia, the British knew, the Americans knew — everybody knew there was a war in Rhodesia. Ours was a justified war, anyway.
Q: The requisition? A:
The requisition was taken up by the General, who took it where I don’t know. The only thing I knew was vehicles were coming with
the requirements — armaments, ammunition, you name it. Some of the weapons we had were about five tonnes and we would push them up a steep mountain. Push, push, up, push, push. Some of the weapons were wheeled, some of them had to be carried. The four-barrelled guns, the 14.5, were wheeled, the 67mm was wheeled, less the mortars which sat on the base plate. We moved all our weapons until a time when we said we are ready for them. I remember vividly one night, it was around 2100hrs when we received our first 67mm gun, quite a long-barrelled gun, it shoots a bullet of 67mm cylindrically at its widest.
The General said let’s fire the weapon towards Ruda. A whole magazine was fired. Q: So you were practising or?
A: Yes, we were practising but also sending a message. That we were ready for them. I remember we put tracer bullets and fired towards Ruda. We ended up with the 12.7 on the ground, infantry, for the ground attacks. It was at Mavonde where we established the Zanla military communications wing, which was commanded by Cde Everisto Nhamo who I had at Pungwe. He had been trained in East Africa for communications and I was his deputy, Mannex Madanhi was the political commissar and the late Mudari, who passed on last month, was logistics, Levis Ngoro was the security man, we were quite a number, the signals platoon. We had developed a codification which was not standard, it was so unique because it was so figurative. Or should I say numerical. Yes numerical. I remember the battle, they intercepted our radios and we exchanged insults. They would ask, which code is that? And we would reply, this is our code and where is yours? War at times is interesting, exciting. (laughing).
The signals unit was situated next to the High Command, just under Mount Cassino. We were in a secure area, no-one would just come in, unless you were on a special errand from the bosses. I remember one morning when we were having breakfast, and an emissary was sent by Cde Rex Nhongo. When I got to him, he asked me, “Cde Gidza, there are people who left in the morning, have they reported to you? There have been gunshots in the mountains, did you hear them?” Then word came down, that Rhodesians had been spotted in the mountain. Which triggered my memory, one evening at feeding time, people were asking, who is this, who is this? And that person disappeared.
We realised these people could have stayed next to the HQ, for two or three days, this we could tell from the tell-tale signs they left behind like excretion, tinned food, which they would bury.
Q: So this was like infiltration? A:
Yes, it was infiltration. They were on a reconnaissance mission. The Selous Scouts, they were dangerous people. Like years ago, we used to have someone who used to stay in a place like Norton, by the time people got to know a lot about them, they would have disappeared. We don’t know where he went.
We had to assemble troops of 100 men to follow the spoors. As we went, these people had gone. Whether they had known, we don’t know but our vehicles had left for Chimoio and as we followed them, we heard firing. Only to find out that there was an anthill where they had mounted their HNGs and were firing. I had three bazookas, LNG and LPG — us commanding those troops. They fired, exposing their positions. We started crawling towards where they were and in the meantime, they had radioed for support. Soon helicopters came and rescued them. We would not manoeuvre further as the helicopters came with aerial support.
We retreated and reported back to HQ and a decision was made to up the vigilance. By that time Mavonde had grown, if I am not mistaken, the base was covering some 60 square kilometres.
The base was made up of seven sections. We had Base 1, where the HQ was; Base 2, 3 (where people who had completed training would prepare to move into Zimbabwe or those who had returned from war, would be resting); Base 4 (training), Base 5 (Chaminuka, for security, where we had prisoners of war or those who had been delinquent at the front and waiting to go for re-orientation), 6 and 7 (logistics, kwaSamora).
The defence of Mavonde was quite strong for the enemy. The enemy had made reconnaissance, I don’t know how many times such that on the day of the attack, if I am not mistaken, it was on September 27 1979. Before the leaders left for Lancaster, I remember Cde Tongogara assembled us, at Chaminuka Base and told us the intel he had and what to expect in their absence. He said, “Cde Gidza, Muzorewa and Smith are coming for this base and if they overrun this base, make sure you also go with them”. I assured him that Mavonde was in safe hands.
That was the last I saw Tongogara alive. (sobs). That man, Mwari vari kudenga. Anyway, he left and he went. When the enemy finally came to attack, they had been overtaken by events because there had been a lot of alterations to the base. We had zig-zagged trenches, dug rooms underground, I checked my watch, it was 0730hrs, they had a routine those idiots. Those were their timings. I had been called by the late Mujuru.
Q: Mujuru didn’t travel to Lancaster?
A: No, Mujuru didn’t travel. Zvinavashe, Tungamirai, Mupanzawarima, all these didn’t travel. Mujuru called me. He said there were arms that had come from Korea, and we should give everyone a gun. Even those under training should get a gun. So I assembled all the comrades, both male and female, to go to Base 3 where there were two Scanias full of arms. As we were going to Base 3, we suddenly heard the sound of LP, and we knew we were under attack. You see what they were doing, they were coming in from Chicamba Dam. They would fly into Mozambique, and towards Chimoio they would turn back and attack us from the Mozambican internal side.
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