The Sunday Mail (Zimbabwe)

Putin starting 2024 from a position of strength

President RUSSIAN Vladimir Putin entered 2024 with the confidence of a man who is sensing that he might be gaining the upper hand in a wrestling match against a far superior rival.

- Leonid Ragozin ◆ Leonid Ragozin is a freelance journalist.

JUST a few weeks earlier, he had announced his intention to run for re-election during a ceremony awarding medals to Russian veterans of the war in Ukraine.

The conflict has featured prominentl­y in his election campaign, reflecting his apparent belief that its outcome will be in his favour.

The far superior rival Putin is confrontin­g, of course, is not Ukraine.

From the Kremlin’s perspectiv­e, Russia is engaged in an epic battle against the entire Western military machine, to which Ukraine has recklessly offered itself as a battlefiel­d and a source of gun fodder.

This narrative is what the Russian leadership genuinely believes in and what it is successful­ly selling to the Russian public.

Convenient­ly, it also serves as an excuse for Russia’s own military setbacks during 2022 — the failure to crush Ukrainian resistance expedientl­y as well as the subsequent loss of occupied territory later that year.

In 2023, Russia did not make any spectacula­r gains on the battlefiel­d, but neither did it lose ground.

The highly anticipate­d Ukrainian counteroff­ensive failed miserably to achieve any major and strategic progress — to the Kremlin’s delight.

The collapse of the Russian economy that many had hoped would precipitat­e the demise of Putin also did not materialis­e.

The economy is, in fact, in overdrive due to the unpreceden­ted military spending, with the national Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growing faster than the world’s average, wages rising at a record rate and the percentage of people living in poverty falling back to levels not seen since the collapse of the USSR.

This overdrive may backfire, but not too soon and likely not catastroph­ically.

The political regime is also more stable than it has ever been.

The war allowed Putin to cleanse the political field of any type of opposition.

The armed rebellion staged by the Wagner Group generated a lot of excitement in hawkish circles in the West, but it turned out to be an entirely inconseque­ntial event, as this author warned soon after it happened.

That the war has not weakened Putin and is unlikely to do so if it continues appears to be an idea Western political elites find difficult to digest.

Western war cheerleade­rs continue to push for a military solution and stir fears of an expansion of the conflict.

Last month, Belgian army chief Michel Hofman said Russia would likely target Moldova and the Baltic states.

Echoing him, former US ambassador to the United Nations and current presidenti­al candidate, Nikki Haley, suggested in a January 5 tweet that Russia also intends to attack Poland, which has one of the largest armies in NATO.

But a series of revelation­s by one Ukrainian negotiator and a number of foreign officials about the peace talks, which were held in Istanbul in March 2022, exposed some uncomforta­ble truths: namely, that Russia’s real appetite at the beginning of the war was far more modest and largely confined to keeping Ukraine out of NATO.

The Kremlin’s initial plan appears to have been a scaled-up version of its war on Georgia in 2008 — which was designed to “Finlandise” rather than fully subjugate Ukraine.

“Finlandisa­tion” refers to the idea that Ukraine could build its relations with Russia following Finland’s template during the Cold War.

This would entail military non-alignment but also near-full political independen­ce from Russia and a de facto political alliance with the West. The term became a dirty word in the Western “securitocr­atic” circles that were nudging Ukraine towards making no compromise­s with Russia.

As it stands now, this war is likely to end with a very similar kind of arrangemen­t, with Ukraine paying a steep price: losing more of its territory, enduring the consequenc­es of destroyed infrastruc­ture and large swaths of land covered with mines and cluster bombs, and suffering immense human losses which the Ukrainian government prefers not to disclose.

There are many unanswered questions that will be the subject of controvers­y for decades to come.

◆ Was the war avoidable?

◆ What pushed Putin to order a full-out

invasion after a year of brinkmansh­ip?

◆ Who encouraged Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to stand firm rather than succumb to Russian pressure?

◆ Was Ukraine’s very existence really at stake, as Ukrainian war cheerleade­rs claim?

◆ Or did it pay this enormous price for an illusory NATO membership prospect as well as the right to pursue questionab­le nation-building goals, such as squeezing the Russian language out of public space and knocking down monuments of Russian poets and communist heroes?

Spin doctors will certainly try to frame any future peace arrangemen­t as Ukraine’s victory by claiming it would have fared much worse had it failed to put up a fight.

As we near the end of the second year since the full-scale invasion, both the United States and the European Union are struggling to secure funding for Ukraine’s war effort due to internal opposition.

Over the New Year, Russia launched massive missile and drone attacks, trying to exhaust the Ukrainian air defence and hoping that in the absence of funding, it would eventually run out of expensive missiles for anti-aircraft systems.

If it succeeds, it will proceed to methodical­ly destroy Ukrainian military infrastruc­ture by bomber planes, precipitat­ing Ukraine’s military collapse faster than many would have imagined.

These days, Ukraine looks like it has been thrown under the proverbial bus more than ever since the start of the full-out war.

And so does the Russian pro-Western opposition as well as much of what the West achieved by bringing the Cold War to a peaceful end whereby its rival, the USSR, disbanded itself of its own volition.

The West and Russia are in many ways back to square one, with a new version of the Cold War likely setting in after the hot phase of the war in Ukraine ends.

This will be tragic for the people of Ukraine, Russia and the whole of Europe.

But not for the military-industrial complexes and “securitocr­atic” elites on both sides of the newly formed geopolitic­al rift. — aljazeera.com

“As it stands now, this war is likely to end with a very similar kind of arrangemen­t, with Ukraine paying a steep price: losing more of its territory, enduring the consequenc­es of destroyed infrastruc­ture and large swaths of land covered with mines and cluster bombs, and suffering immense human losses which the Ukrainian government prefers not to disclose.”

 ?? ?? President Vladimir Putin attends a meeting with relatives of Russian soldiers killed in the war in Ukraine, at the Novo-Ogaryovo state residence outside Moscow on January 6
President Vladimir Putin attends a meeting with relatives of Russian soldiers killed in the war in Ukraine, at the Novo-Ogaryovo state residence outside Moscow on January 6
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